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The study of optimal procurement contracts under informational asymmetries gener-
ally assumes that the cost disturbance a¤ecting contractor’s cost function is not observed
by the principal. We assume here that this variable (which may represent environmen-
tal or geology conditions...) can be observed in the process of the contract. Thus, the
principal is now able to make the payment contingent on the realization of this variable.
In this context, the aim of this paper is to compare a linear incentive contract with a
”modi…ed” …xed-price contract, which allows the payment to the selected contractor to
be independent upon his bid in the case of a high-cost value of exogenous uncertainty.
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11 Introduction
In 1999, direct procurement spending on thepart ofgovernmentsaround the world amounted
to an estimated $5.433 trillion (U.S.) or approximately 18% oftotal world economicoutput1.
Public procurement particularly represents about 11% of the EU’s GDP2. Given the impor-
tant size of goods and services bought by governments, the design of contracts minimizing
acquisition costs is a signi…cant question which has been studied in the mechanism design
literature3 as a Principal/Agent problem. In such a situation, the government (principal)
employs a …rm (agent) to perform some task. However, contracts between principal and
agent are quite di¢cult to design under asymmetries of information (adverse selection and
moral hazard) and exogenous uncertainties.
La¤ont and Tirole (1987) and McAfee and McMillan (1987a) characterize the optimal
contract when several risk-neutral bidders compete for the award of a contract. They show
that the optimal allocation can be implemented by o¤ering the …rms a menu of linear con-
tracts (namely, the optimal contract is linear in realized costs but non-linear in bids). When
bidders are risk averse, thedesign of the optimal contract is still an open question. However,
McAfee and McMillan (1986) characterize the optimal contract that encompasses risk aver-
sion, adverse selection and moral hazard, but with the a priori restriction to linear contract.
The optimal linear contract is called a linear incentive contract and combines features of the
cost-plus contract and the …xed-price contract. Indeed, the government’s payment depends
on both the …rm’s bid and the …rm’s actual costs, according to a pre-arranged ratio. Linear
incentive contracts are planned by the US procurement regulation4 and are notably used by
the US Department of Defense for weapons acquisition5.
A common featureofMcAfeeand McMillan(1986, 1987a) andLa¤ont andTirole(1987) is
that the ex post realized cost oftheproject is observed by the principal whereas the e¢ciency
1Source: Oxford Analytica Academic Database.
2Source: http://europa.eu.int/business/en/topics/publicproc/
3See La¤ont and Tirole (1993) for a survey of this literature.
4See the Federal Acquisition Regulation (Subpart 16-4).
5For a detailed analysis of linear incentive contracts, see McAfee and McMillan (1988).
2parameter of each …rm and the winner’s e¤ort level are private information. Furthermore, in
McAfee and McMillan (1986), thecost function ofthe…rms involves a shock which represents
exogenous uncertainties and which is not observed by the principal. Note that the cost
function of La¤ont and Tirole (1987) does not involve a shock. Nevertheless, they show
that the optimal contract is robust to the introduction of a random disturbance in the cost
function6. So, a common feature of optimal contracts is that the cost shock is not observed
ex post by the principal. Thus, the form of the payment can not be contingent on this cost
disturbance.
However, in procurement practice, the magnitude of exogenous uncertainties may be
observed during the production of the project. Wecan think for instance ofenvironmental or
geology conditions.... Resulting from this observation, there may bea place forrenegotiation.
This argument may explain why optimal contracts are not widely used in practice. Indeed,
most projects are awarded by means of …xed-price contracts7. The price is then arranged
before the work is begun. Under a …xed-price contract, the …rm is given the appropriate
incentive to minimize its costs. However, it forces the …rm to bear all the risks due to
exogenous uncertainties. In practice, ex post adaptations of the initial payment by means of
change orders allow a shift of risk from the agent to the principal, so that initial …xed-price
contracts may involve a renegotiation. In Bajari and Tadelis (2001) e.g., the design of the
project may be incomplete and the probability of ex post change orders is endogenous.
In this paper, we depart from this analysis, considering complete contracts. Following
McAfee and McMillan (1986), we consider that the procurement problem is one of ex ante
asymmetric information with moral hazard. We also consider that the ex post realized cost
of the project is a¤ected by exogenous uncertainties represented by a random variable µ.
However, unlikeMcAfeeandMcMillan (1986), we assumethat µ is observed aftertheselected
contractor has chosen its cost-reducing e¤ort. We also assume that µ can be contractible.
Thus, the principal is able to make the payment to the selected …rm contingent on the
6Obviously, this results holds when the principal and the potential contractors are risk-neutral (see La¤ont
and Tirole (1993)).
7Cost-plus contracts are also often used. The …rm is then reimbursed for costs plus a stipulated fee.
3realization of µ.
In this framework, we …rst derive the optimal linear incentive (LI) contracts when the
payment depends on the realization of the cost shock, i.e. the payment is ”state-dependent”.
As we consider that µ can take on one of two values, we now have two di¤erent cost-share
parameters for the two values of µ: However, we show that the expected price under this
”state-dependent” LI contract is equal to the one under McAfee and McMillan’s (1986) LI
contract.
Then, we design a new contract which speci…es the following payment. In the case of a
low-cost state, the payment corresponds to the one of a …xed-price contract. In the case of
a high-cost state, the winner is reimbursed for the ex post realized cost plus the disutility
of his e¤ort. This kind of procedure can be called a ”modi…ed …xed-price” (MFP) contract.
Although the e¤ort level is not observable, the payment can be contingent on it since the
moral hazard problem is solved. Indeed, we show that the selected agent chooses the …rst
best e¤ort level. If the principal was restricted to choose between an LI contract and an
MFP contract, the goal of this paper is to know which contract minimizes the principal’s
expected payment to the selected agent.
Following McAfee and McMillan (1986), in the special case of risk-neutral bidders, the
optimal LI contract trades o¤ stimulating competition in the initial bidding against giving
the …rm incentives to reduce its production costs. Under an MFP contract, we show that
the selected agent chooses the …rst best e¤ort level. However, the bidding competition e¤ect
now depends upon the exogenous probability of realization of a high-cost state. Intuitively,
an MFP contract yields a lower expected price than an LI contract if the gain from inducing
the …rst best e¤ort level is greater than the (potential) loss in stimulating competition in the
initial bidding.
42 The optimal LI contract when the payment is ”state de-
pendent”
Following McAfee and McMillan (1986), we consider that n bidders compete for the realiza-
tion of a project. However, in contrast to McAfee and McMillan (1986), we restrict attention
to risk-neutral bidders. Given that agent i is selected, the actual ex post cost of the project
is
Ci =ci¡ei+µ;
where ci is the e¢ciency parameter (including opportunity costs) of agent i; ei represents the
cost-reduction dueto agent i’se¤ort and µ denotesa random variable representing exogenous
uncertainties. The principal neither observes ci nor ei. However, it is common knowledge
that ci is independently drawn from a distribution F (:); which corresponding density f (:)
has support [c¡; c+]: Weassume that F (:) has a monotone hazard rate(F=f non-decreasing).
For agent i, the choice of an e¤ort ei yields a disutility (in monetary units) h(ei) = e2
i=2d
(with d > 0), which can not be incorporated in his bid. The function h(:) is also common
knowledge. Following McAfee and McMillan (1986), we assume that the ex post realized
cost Ci of the selected …rm is observed. However, the main departure from McAfee and
McMillan (1986) is to assume that µ is also observed after the selected contractor exerts its
e¤ort in reducing production costs. µ is assumed to be contractible and the payment to the
winner can be contingent on its realization: We assume that µ can take on one of two values:
µH (with probability p) and µL (with probability (1 ¡p)): We also assume without loss of
generality that
E(µ) = pµH +(1¡p)µL =0; with µH >0 > µL:
Note that the main departure from McAfee and McMillan (1986) is to assume that µ is
observed and contractible. Dunne and Loewenstein (1995) emphasize8 that in McAfee and
8In contrast to our model, Dunne and Loewenstein (1995) analyse the optimal linear incentive contract
when µ is privately observed by the selected agent. This agent then reports (or misreports) the value of µ and
monitoring is assumed to be costly for the principal.
5McMillan (1986), µ can be inferred by the principal since Ci is observed, but the payment
can not be contingent on the realization of µ: In our model, if µ was not contractible, we
would have a special case of that of McAfee and McMillan (1986) with a binary uncertainty,
with risk-neutral bidders and with a quadratic disutility of e¤ort function.
De…ne CiH = ci ¡ei +µH and CiL = ci ¡ei + µL: Particularly, the sequence of events





®HCiH +(1 ¡®H)bi = bi +®H(CiH ¡bi) if µ =µH; with 0 ·®H < 1
®LCiL +(1 ¡®L)bi =bi +®L (CiL ¡bi) if µ =µL; with 0 ·®L <1
(1)
where bi denotes the bid submitted by agent i:
Thus, the principal commits to reimburse a fraction ®H of the ex post realized cost if
µ = µH and a fraction ®L otherwise9. The contract is awarded by means of a …rst-price
sealed-bid auction. Then, the winner chooses his cost-reduction e¤ort. µ and Ci are observed
and the winner gets the payment Pi. The optimal LI contract is designed by the cost-
share parameters ®H and ®L which minimize the principal’s expected payment while taking
into account bidder’s responses. In contrast to McAfee and McMillan (1986), bidders are
assumed to be risk-neutral, so the problem of risk-sharing between the principal and the
selected contractor disappears. The optimal choices of ®H and ®L are only determined by
a trade-o¤ between stimulating bidding competition and giving the selected …rm incentives
to reduce its production costs. The larger the parameters ®H and ®L are, the lower is the
government’s expected payment because of the bidding competition e¤ect, but the higher is
the government’s expected payment because of the moral hazard e¤ect.
Under an LI contract, agent i’s expected pro…t (where expectation is taken over µ) when
he submits a bid bi is
E(¼) = p[bi +®H(CiH ¡bi) ¡CiH ¡h(ei)] +(1 ¡p)[bi +®L (CiL ¡bi) ¡CiL ¡h(ei)]
= [1 ¡p(®H ¡®L) ¡®L] (bi ¡ci +ei) ¡h(ei) +p(®H ¡®L)µH:
9In McAfee and McMillan (1986), the payment to the selected agent is Pi = bi+®(Ci ¡bi). The cost-share
parameter ® is designed to minimize the expected payment, while expectation is taken over µ:
6The selected agent chooses his e¤ort level to maximize his expected pro…t. eLI¤
i thus satis…es
eLI¤
i = h0¡1 [1¡p(®H ¡®L) ¡®L] ) eLI¤
i =d[1 ¡p(®H ¡®L) ¡®L]:
Consider now thebidding strategy of agent i: Let b(:) denotes the strictly increasing bidding
strategy employed by all his opponents. Since the contract is awarded to the lowest bidder,
i wins with a bid bi if






¢¤n¡1 : Agent i’s interim expected pro…t is then







Following themethodology in McAfeeand McMillan (1987b), wecanshow that thesymmetric
Nash equilibrium bidding strategy bLI (ci) of agent i is given by
bLI (ci) =ci+
Rc+













[1 ¡p(®H ¡®L) ¡®L]
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Given bLI (ci), the payment rule (1) and the fact that the principal is risk neutral, the
































n¡1 f (ci) is the probability density of the lowest expected cost of the n
bidders. Then we have10
PLI = c¡ +n[1¡p(®H ¡®L) ¡®L]
Z c+
c¡ (1¡F (ci))











c¡ (1 ¡F (ci))
n dci
10See the appendix.
7The optimal cost-share parameters, ®¤
H and ®¤



































c¡ (1 ¡F (ci))




We have an in…nity of solutions for (®¤
L; ®¤
H): The only thing that matters is the relation
between these two parameters. Replacing ®¤
H by its value in (3) yields the expected payment













Note that this expected payment is the same as it would be under the state-independent
contract of McAfee and McMillan (1986). Furthermore, note that if the principal chooses
®¤
H =®¤










and this value is equal to the cost-share parameter ®¤ that would be chosen under McAfee
and McMillan’s (1986) contract given our assumptions.
The fact that the expected payment under McAfee and McMillan’s (1986) contract is not
modi…ed when the payment becomes ”state-dependent” can be easily justi…ed. Indeed, even
if the contract involves two cost-share parameters, the form of the payment is still an LI
contract whatever therealization of µ is: Therefore, thepayment is only taken in expectation
over µ: The optimal bid and e¤ort level of agent i are adjusted given the ”state-dependent”
payment rule but the expected payment remains unchanged.












= d (1 ¡p)
2 > 0
83 The MFP contract
We now turn to the analysis of the MFP contract. The sequence of events under the MFP













if µ = µH
(5)
The contract is awarded by means ofa …rst-price sealed-bid auction. Each potential contrac-
tor submits a bid bMFP
i . The lowest bidder is selected. Then he chooses his optimal level,
eMFP¤
i ; ofcost-reductione¤ort. Therealization ofµ isthen observed and theselectedcontrac-
tor is paid according to the payment rule (5). Indeed, if µ =µL, the payment is a …xed-price.
Otherwise, ifµ =µH, theprincipal reimburses theex-post realizedcost CiH =ci¡eMFP¤
i +µH





; of agent i’s e¤ort. So, with probability p; it is common knowl-
edgethat the payment to the winner will not depend upon his bid. Our intuition is that this
procedure is rather similar to many procurement practices, even if there is no renegotiation











Given the payment rule of the MFP contract, agent i’s expected pro…t when he submits a
bid bMFP









































12In order to establish a comparison with the LI contract, this assumption of commitment is consistent with
the assumption of commitment to the cost-share parameters ®H and ®L:
13See Bajari and Tadelis (2001) for a model analysing the choice between …xed-price contracts and cost-plus
contracts in a context of costly renegotiation.
9The winner chooses the …rst best e¤ort level, corresponding to the e¤ort level under a …xed-
price contract. However, unlike a …xed-price contract, the principal now bears all the risk
linked to exogenous uncertainties. Indeed, given the payment rule, the selected agent knows
that with probability p, hewill not get any pro…t, but heknows ex-interim with certainty the
total cost CiL hewill haveto bear with probability (1 ¡p): So, theselected agent is actually
proposed a “modi…ed” …xed-price contract. Indeed, the ex-post total cost is not a¤ected by
uncertainty and the payment is lower since multiplied by (1¡p): Intuitively, replacing a
…xed-price contract by an MFP contract is valuable for the agent if the gain in shifting risks
from the agent to the principal o¤sets the payment reduction.
Under an MFP contract, agent i’s interim expected pro…t when he submits a bid bMFP
i
is
















Each bidder i chooses bMFP
i to maximize (6). We can show that the symmetric Nash equi-
librium bidding strategy is given by
bMFP (ci) = ci +
R c+
ci (1 ¡F (s))
n¡1ds


















i , we have









Given bMFP (ci), the payment rule (5) and the fact that the principal is risk neutral, the




























We can noticethat PMFP is decreasing in p: Thisremark canbejusti…ed. When thepayment
reimburses the ex post total cost plus the disutility of e¤ort, no rent is left to the selected
10contractor since themost e¢cient contractoris selected and choosesthe …rst best e¤ort level.
Then, the payment is lower when p approaches 1, but isnot equal to 1 (ifp =1; the payment
does not depend upon agent’s bid, so the principal can not select the most e¢cient bidder).
Furthermore, we can justify the choice of the form of the payment when µH is observed.
Assoon as µ isobserved, information becomes complete. Indeed, thee¤ort level is at the…rst
best and the principal can infer the cost ci of the selected contractor since he has submitted
his bid. Therefore, when µ is observed, the principal knows all the components of Ci: So, ex
post, theprincipal hasto regulatea …rm under completeinformation. Theoptimal regulation
policy is then to reimburse the ex post realized cost plus the disutility of the …rm’s e¤ort14.
4 LI or MFP contracts ?
We can compare the expected price under an LI contract with the expected price under an
MFP contract, whileemphasizing the bidding competition e¤ect and the moral hazard e¤ect.
First compare how both contracts are a¤ected by the moral hazard e¤ect. The di¤erence
between the increase in expected price of the LI contract and the MFP contract is then
d
2®¤2. A su¢cient condition for the MFP contract to be chosen is then that the reduction
in expected price, due to the bidding competition e¤ect, must be stronger under an MFP
contract than under an LI contract. This condition can be written as :
p >®¤:














c¡ F (ci)[1 ¡F (ci)]
n¡1 dci: (7)




c¡ (1 ¡F (ci))
n¡1 F (ci)dci <1: (8)
14See La¤ont and Tirole (1993).
11From (7) et (8), it is obvious that a necessary condition for the LI contract to be chosen is
p <1=2: The following proposition summarizes the comparison of contracts.
Proposition 1 : Si p < 1





c¡ F (ci)[1 ¡F (ci)]
n¡1 dci;
and an LI contract otherwise. If p > 1
2; the MFP contract should be preferred.
Finally, the choice of a contract depends on the number of bidders, the size of the moral
hazard e¤ect, the probability of a high-cost state µH and a term which re‡ects the bidding
competition e¤ects15.
5 Conclusion
This articlehasproposed a comparison between expected pricesunderLI contracts and MFP
contracts when the payment can becontingent on therealization of a random variable which
represents exogenous uncertainties and which can only take on one of two values. We have
shown that the expected price under McAfee and McMillan’s (1986) LI contract is the same
as under a ”state-dependent” LI contract. We have also designed an MFP contract which
allows the payment to the selected contractor to be independent upon his bid in the case of
a high-cost value of exogenous uncertainty. Then, we have derived conditions under which
the MFP contract may dominate the LI contract.
Note …nally that our analysis is a …rst stab at comparing LI and MFP contracts. Indeed,
we have adopted a positiveapproach to model the MFP contract. The design of the optimal
contract under the informational structure considered is an open question, even in the case
of risk-neutral bidders. We leave it for further research.
15More exactly, the expected rents stemming from the bidder’s private cost information
is equal to n(1 ¡®
¤)
R c+
c¡ (1 ¡F (ci))
n¡1 F (ci)dci under an LI contract, and is equal to
n(1 ¡p)
R c+
c¡ (1 ¡ F (ci))


































[1 ¡p(®H ¡®L) ¡®L]
Replacing in (2), we get
PLI = c¡ +
Z c+
c¡
(1¡F (ci))n dci +n[1¡p(®H ¡®L) ¡®L]
Z c+
c¡








i by its value yields equation (3).
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